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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
damages so that they might serve as private attorneys general.10 4 However,
since the concept of a suit by a state as parens patriae to redress antitrust
violations is no longer viable, the courts should now concern themselves
with the question of workable alternatives which would be in the best
interests of those consumers faced with compensable - albeit small -
injuries due to violations of the antitrust laws.' 0
James M. Papada, III
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTIONS -
GRANTING OF TAX BENEFITS TO DISCRIMINATORY FRATERNAL ORDERS
Is A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION ASPECT OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT.
McGlotten v. Connally (D.D.C. 1972)
Plaintiff, a black American allegedly denied membership in a fra-
ternal order' solely because of his race, brought a class action in federal
district court seeking to enjoin2 the Secretary of the Treasury from grant-
ing tax benefits to fraternal and nonprofit organizations which discriminate
in their membership on the basis of race.3 Plaintiff contended that the
104. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
130-31 (1969).
105. It would seem that only two approaches remain. First, a class action
might be brought pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23. However, in the instant case the
class action count was dismissed as "unmanageable" by the district court. See note
8 supra. Second, an individual consumer might sue in his own right, but this approach
also is fraught with difficulties - cost of initiation of the suit, attorney fees, and
discovery costs. When weighed against the comparatively small amount of damage
which one consumer or even a group of consumers usually sustains in such an action,
the cost of the suit becomes prohibitive for him. See Comment, supra note 30, at
570-71.
1. The fraternal order in question was the Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D.D.C. 1972).
2. Plaintiff sought the following relief: (1) to enjoin the Internal Revenue
Service from any further approval of applications by segregated nonprofit clubs and
fraternal orders for tax exempt status under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 501 (c) (7) &
(8) ; (2) to require the revocation of tax exemptions previously issued such groups;
and (3) to require the promulgation of regulations prohibiting the granting of tax
exempt status to any segregated nonprofit club or fraternal order. Additionally,
plaintiff requested similar relief with respect to INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2055,
2106(a) & 2522 which provide for deductibility of contributions for estate and gift
tax purposes. Id.
3. Section 144 of the Constitution and statutes of the Grand Lodge of the
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks provides in pertinent part that
No person shall be accepted as a member of this Order unless he be a
white male citizen of the United States of America ...
The By-Laws and Rules of Order of Portland, Oregon, Lodge #142 conform
to the National Constitution in Article II: Membership § 1 :
Applications for membership shall be received only from white male
citizens of the United States of America ....
Id. at 450 n.1.
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Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the "Code") did not, in fact, authorize
such tax benefits; that if it did, the sections of the Code involved were un-
constitutional; and that these benefits were a form of federal financial
assistance in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 (the
"Act"). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint both on jurisdictional
grounds5 and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 6
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dis-
missed the complaint as it applied to nonprofit clubs but found that the
plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief could be granted with respect to
fraternal orders. The court held that the granting of exemptions from the
income tax and the granting of deductions to the income tax for contribu-
tions to fraternal orders which discriminate in their membership on the
basis of race was impermissible "state action,"7 unconstitutional under the
equal protection aspect of the due process clause of the fifth amendment;
contrary to the congressional policy against racial discrimination; and,
violative of Title VI of the Act.8 McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448
(D.D.C. 1972).
The two basic issues involved were whether the granting of these
tax benefits constituted "state action" so as to be within the scope of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment and whether they constituted
federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title VI of the Act. The
court split the first question into three distinct issues: (1) whether the
granting of a deduction for contributions to discriminatory fraternal orders
was sufficient federal involvement to constitute unconstitutional "state
action;" (2) whether the granting of tax exemptions to nonprofit clubs
(other than fraternal orders) which discriminate was sufficient federal
involvement to constitute unconstitutional "state action ;" and (3) whether
the granting of tax exemptions to fraternal orders which discriminate is
sufficient federal involvement to constitute unconstitutional "state action."
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). See note 67 infra.
5. The court felt that both Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), and Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), required the convening of a three-judge court where
there was a substantial constitutional claim, even though the attack was on the
constitutionality of a statute as applied and was coupled with a claim that the action
in question was not authorized by the statute. Finding the plaintiff's constitutional
claims substantial, the court held the three-judge court to be properly convened.
Relying on Flast and Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the court reasoned that "a black American has
standing to challenge a system of federal support and encouragement of segregated
fraternal organizations." 338 F. Supp. at 452. Finally, the court held that neither
the Tax Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1970), nor the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-55 (1970), prohibited the instant suit because the central
purpose of those acts was clearly inappropriate to the case. 338 F. Supp. at 453-54.
6. Since the instant case was decided on the Government's motion to dismiss,
the court assumed plaintiff's allegations were true and did not decide whether, on
the merits, the alleged discrimination violated equal protection.
7. "State action" is used throughout this note in a broad sense to include any
actions by either the state or federal governments or other parties which lie within
the purview of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the
equal protection aspect of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
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A finding of "state action" is the prerequisite to the conclusion that
there has been a denial of equal protection under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment9 as well as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' 0 The requirement of "state action" is certainly met by direct
actions of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the state or
federal governments." However, the courts have been somewhat reluctant
to extend the restrictions of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to acts by private individuals and organizations, even though
the government may be indirectly involved, in light of the Civil Rights
Cases,12 which held that the fourteenth amendment was inapplicable to
purely private discrimination. Thus, between the area of purely private
discrimination and direct governmental action, there exists a murky area
9. Originally the equal protection requirement was thought to pertain only
to the actions of the state governments and not the federal government. Detroit
Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312(1921). However, in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court
held that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process,"
thus formulating an equal protection aspect of the fifth amendment's due process clause.
Id. at 499. It is now a generally accepted rule of constitutional law that the equal
protection requirement applies both to the state and federal governments. For an
excellent study of the original understanding of equal protection, see Frank & Munro,
The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REv.
131 (1950). For an equally excellent study of the entire area of equal protection,
see Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
10. The Supreme Court, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), established
the principle that state action was necessary before the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment could be invoked. The Court held that only action by a
state and not "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is . . . the subject-matter
of the amendment." Id. at 11. This principle has been consistently reiterated by the
Court:
Since the decision of that Court in the Civil Rights Cases . . . the principle has
become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be
said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). See also Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208
(1957).
In his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that
a private corporation exercising a public or quasi-public function when it acted,
should be deemed to be acting for the state and subject to the fourteenth amendment.
See 109 U.S. at 58-59. See also Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512,
536, 87 N.E.2d 541, 551 (1949) (Fuld, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981
(1950).
II. See Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Four-
tenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (1958), where the author noted that:
.The Court rather early began the extension of the term state action to cover
not only legislative action . . . but action of the judicial and executive branches
as well. And there was a vertical extension to include all governmental units
subordinate to the state. The Court has found violations of the amendment by
the state courts, legislatures, executives, tax boards, boards of education, counties,
and cities, among others.
Id. at 378 (footnotes omitted). See also Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 86 (1967) ; Henkin,
Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 482-87
(1962) ; Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961) ; Reference,
State Action - A Study of Requirements Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 RACE
REL. L. REP. 613 (1956).
12. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See note 10 supra.
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where a significant degree of indirect governmental involvement can be-
come "state action" for purposes of the fifth or fourteenth amendments.
Since the "state action" requirement was delineated in the Civil
Rights Cases, courts have devised various theories by which to find that
the indirect involvement of the government with a private organization
or individual is "state action. ' 13 However, the Supreme Court has never
arrived at a concrete definition of what exactly constitutes "state action.' 14
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,15 the Court said:
[T]o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state re-
sponsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an "impossible task"
which "This Court has never attempted." . . . Only by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.' 6
Through the application of this case-by-case approach, the courts have
found "state action" where the government was so involved with a private
organization that the activities of the organization were not purely private.
However, the view that the provision of state financial aid was sufficient
governmental involvement had not always been accepted, 7 and even today,
13. Among the situations where state action has been found are: (1) a private
individual discriminating under state mandate (Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) ; Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. &
Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955) ; see Reference, supra note 11, at 630-31) ; (2)
an organization performing quasi-governmental functions (Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1964) (privately owned town) ; Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944) (labor union) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (political party) ;
see Reference, supra note 11, at 635-37) ; (3) a lessee from the state (Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) ; see Reference, supra note 11,
at 631-33) ; and (4) a private organization acting with apparent government approval
(Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
14. This may not be an undesirable position for the Supreme Court, because
as one commentator suggested, if there were one exclusive theory or even five set
theories as to what private action constituted "state action," the concept would
become a shelter to racism since it could never encompass all the endless variations
which could be devised by those wishing to discriminate. The doctrine must remain
vague and ambiguous or else become arbitrary. Black, supra note 11, at 90-91.
15. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
16. Id. at 722, quoting Kotch v. Board of River Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556
(1947). This position was reiterated by the Court in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) :
This Court has never attempted the "impossible task" of formulating an
infallible test for determining whether the State "in any of its manifestations"
has become significantly involved in private discriminations.
Id. at 378.
17. In Kerr v. Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 721 (1945), the court held that state financial aid plus a certain degree of
government control rendered the library's actions "state action." See Abernathy,
supra note 11, at 388. However, in Norris v. Mayor & City Council, 78 F. Supp. 451(D. Md. 1948) (subsidy from state and city represented 20 per cent of total income),
the court distinguished Kerr by reason of the control exercised by the state and held
that financial aid alone would not support a finding of state action. In Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 229 N.Y. 519, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), it was held that aid
by the government in the form of tax exemptions and use of the power of eminent
domain was insufficient to be considered state action.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held in
Mitchell v. Boys Club, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957), that aid given by the
Government to a private corporation was insufficient in itself to change the character
of the corporation from private to public. In that case, a Negro youth sought to
have the boys club declared an agency of the Government and to enjoin its denial
[VOL. 18
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it is unclear whether any financial aid whatsoever 18 subjects a private
organization to the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment a fortiori.
At present it would seem that under the Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial
Assistance Commission test,19 any purposeful aid to discrimination, or
under the Griffin v. State Board of Education test,20 any significant aid
which has the effect of fostering discrimination, though not purposefully
discriminatory, could be deemed unconstitutional "state action.' 2 1
of membership solely on the basis of his race. The club was allowed the use of
District of Columbia facilities, and funds were solicited by the police for the club
but no public moneys were used to support it. However, in Statom v. Board of
Comm'rs, 233 Md. 57, 195 A.2d 41 (1963), the court held, upon circumstances almost
identical to those in Mitchell, that discriminatory activities of a boys club were
"within the ambit of conduct proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 66,
195 A.2d at 47. The court reasoned that the donation of public property to the club
was more clearly supportive of a finding of state action than the leasing of public
property by the state in the Burton case. Moreover, the court indicated that Mitchell
was no longer consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of "state action."
The Statom court did qualify its decision, however, stating that "[a] mere casual
or occasional use of, or permission to use, public facilities by a private organization
..." was not state action because the state had to be involved to a significant extent.
Id.
18. In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court had indicated in
dicta that, at. least with respect to racial segregation in schools, it would not permit
any state to aid such discrimination:
State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds,
or property cannot be squared with the Amendment's command that no State
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added). However, the lower federal courts have not given full
effect to this dicta. See Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va.
1965) (three-judge court), rev'd, 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969) (three-judge
court); Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833
(E.D. La. 1967) (three-judge court), aff'd 389 U.S. 571 (1968) ; note 21 infra.
19. 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968). See note 21
infra.
20. 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965), rev'd, 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va.
1969). See note 21 infra.
21. In Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Supreme Court
held that the government's closing of public schools while contributing to the
support of segregated private schools, by means of tuition grants and tax credits
for contributions to such schools, was a denial of the right of Negro children to the
equal protection of the laws. The Court deemed the financial aid significant but
indicated that it was not the sole factor upon which the finding of "state action" was
based. A district court in Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va.
1965), rev'd. 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969), interpreted this Supreme Court
decision to mean that the criterion for determining "state action," with respect to
financial aid to segregated private schools, was whether "the funds will be used to
provide the whole or the greater part of the cost of operation of a segregated
school .... " Id. at 562. However, the aid to the segregated schools was held not
to be unconstitutional per se. Id. at 563.
Significantly, the district court in Griffin did not distinguish between direct
grants to schools and the indirect grants to the pupils themselves as provided by
the statute in question. Thus, even indirect grants to schools, if sufficient to meet
the Griffin "predominent" test (a ratio of the amount of the grant to the cost of
operation and maintenance), will bring the schools within the equal protection re-
quirement. See Spratt, Federal Tax Exemption for Private Segregated Schools:
The Crumbling Foundation, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 32 (1970).
In Poindexter, the district court rejected the Griffin "predominant" test and
found tuition grants to be unconstitutional, holding that:
Any affirmative and purposeful state aid promoting private discrimination vio-
lates the equal protection clause.
The payment of public funds in any amount through a state com-
mission under authority of a state law is undeniably state action. The question
NOVEMBER 1972]
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However, the question of what exactly constitutes sufficient state
involvement through financial aid such that it will be considered significant
remains unanswered. It would seem that where the aid is to assist segre-
gated schools, the courts will have no difficulty in finding the "state action"
significant. However, in terms of the weighing and sifting test of Burton,
the same amount of aid would not necessarily be considered significant
when applied to entities other than schools, such as fraternal orders."2 It
is whether such action in aid of private discrimination violates the equal pro-
tection clause.
[D]ecisions on the constitutionality of state involvement in private dis-
crimination do not turn on whether the state aid adds up to 51 per cent or
adds up only to 49 per cent of the support of the segregated institution. The
criterion is whether the state is so stgnificantly involved in the private dis-
crimination as to render the state action and the private action violative of the
equal protection clause.
275 F. Supp. at 835, 854 (emphasis supplied by the court). The court felt that the
proper focal point was the state's approval or sponsorship of private segregated
schools.
The constitutional odium of official approval of race discrimination has no
necessary relation to the extent of the State's financial support of a dis-
criminatory institution. Any aid to segregated schools that is the product of
the State's affirmatiye, purposeful policy of fostering segregated schools and
has the effect of encouraging discrimination is significant state involvement in
private discrimination. (We distinguish, therefore, state aid from tax benefits,
tree schoolbooks, and other products of the State's traditional policy of benevo-
lence toward charitable and educational institutions.)
Id. See Coffey v. State Educ. Finance Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss.
1969); Lee v. Macon Co. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967),
aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Lee v. Macon Bd. ofEduc., 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd.,
197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
The Poindexter court, finding that the determination of what is significant
state involvement may depend on the circumstances, quoted from Commonwealth
v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 392 F2d 120, cert. denied,
391 U.S. 921 (1968): "'Where the conscious purpose of the State action is to
foster discrimination, the mere fact of such action requires constitutional sanctions.' "275 F. Supp. at 855 (emphasis supplied by the Brown court). The court also quoted
from Simkins v. Cone Memorial J-osp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 938 (1964) :
Where there is no evidence of purposeful participation in private discrimination,
the percentage of state aid is relevant ... [butl "this is not merely a controversy
over a sum of money."
275 F. Supp. at 855.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reversed its opinion
in Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ. based on the holdings in Poindexter and Brown v.
South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C. 1968) (three-judge
court). The court held:
[A]ny assist whatever by the State towards provision of a racially segregated
education, exceeds the pale of tolerance demarked by the Constitution. In ourjudgment, it follows, that neither motive nor purpose is an indispensable element
of the breach. The effect of the State's contribution is a sufficient determinant,
with effect ascertained entirely objectively.
296 F. Supp. at 1181 (emphasis supplied by the court).
See Note, Tax Exemptions for Racial Discrimination in Education, 23
TAx L. REV. 399, 417 (1968) ("Evidently, even the slightest government participation
in segregated education, if designed purposefully to promote private discrimination,
is now forbidden.")
22. See Note, The Tax-Exempt Status of Segregated Schools, 24 TAx L. REV.
409, 420-21 (1969), where the author suggested that the application of equal pro-
tection to deny tax exemptions to private schools could also be applied to dis-
criminatory fraternal organizations. However, private schools serve a public function
and therefore the state has a greater interest and obligation to insure that they do
not discriminate, while social and fraternal orders serve a more private function
[VoL. 18
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is possible that, in areas other than school desegregation, the courts could
look to the Griffin test rather than the Poindexter test,28 especially where
the aid is in the form of tax benefits - something which the Poindexter
opinion specifically excluded from its holding.24 Even though the Griffin
test can no longer be applied to schools, it still may be applicable in other
areas, limiting Poindexter and the reversing opinion of Griffin to their facts.
Tax benefits are not universally recognized as aid within the meaning
of "state action" so as to come within the equal protection requirement. 25
In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,26 the New York court deemed tax
exemptions insufficient state involvement to bring private action within
the scope of the fourteenth amendment. However, at that time, financial
assistance in general was not necessarily considered to be "state action."
Assuming the degree of financial aid by way of tax benefits would be
sufficient to be deemed significant state involvement Were it direct aid,
there is still no certainty that "state action" will be found.27
In August 1967, the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") said
that it would deny tax exemptions to any discriminatory private school
that was the direct recipient of state financial assistance, relying on the
mandate of Aaron v. Cooper,28 which the IRS believed had held illegal any
direct payments by governmental units to private schools organized to evade
desegregation.2 9 The IRS did not view the exemptions granted to those
segregated schools to be "state action" but felt that, if a school received
direct aid, such as a tuition grant from the state, it would fall within the
requirements of the equal protection clause. The IRS,80 distinguishing its
decision on the basis of charitable trust law,3 1 "took the position that con-
*tributions to community recreational facilities would be deductible only if
the facilities were open on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. No dis-
tinction was drawn between state-involved and privately endowed facili-
ties .... -32 These contradictory rulings remained standing until 1970
wherein the rights of association and even discrimination may be protected by the
courts.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. 275 F. Supp. at 854.
25. See Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to Private Organiza-
tions, 61 HARV. L. REV. 344, 350 (1948), in which the author suggested certaindifficulties in using tax exemptions as a basis for invoking the fourteenth amendment.
26. See note 17 supra.
27. See Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Stipp. 674 (E.D.
La. 1962) (state property tax exemption did not constitute state action). See alsoChicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970) ; Bright v.Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Note, Federal Tax Benefits to
Segregated Private Schools, 68 COLUm. L. Rlv. 922, 937-38 (1968).
28. 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See note 18 supra.
29. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1967, at 24, col. 3.
30. Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 113.
31. See Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will ofStephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 993 n.56 (1957).
32. Spratt, supra note 21, at 9-10.
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when, following the decision of Green v. Kennedy,3 3 the IRS changed its
policy concerning tax exemptions to segregated schools.34
In Green v. Kennedy, the court analyzed the difference between tax
benefits and direct grants and concluded that there was only a difference
of degree. The court reasoned that tax benefits under the Code were
substantial and significant governmental support - the significant support
being the deductions for contributions rather than the exemptions to the
schools themselves.35 The court also stated that the absence of an ex-
press discriminatory purpose on the part of the Government did not
necessarily mean there was no unconstitutional "state action," especially if
the Government action materially supported school segregation. 6 In sup-
port of its position, the Green court relied upon Simkins v. Cone Memorial
Hospital.37 Although Simkins applied specifically to outright grants made
to a hospital without discriminatory purpose, it was deemed sufficiently
analogous to provide "substantial support for a similar ruling in a case of a
'matching grant,' which is in effect the impact of a Federal tax credit or
deduction."38 The court found that the IRS interpretation of the consti-
tutional mandate was too narrow and ignored the significance of current
federal support from tax benefits and the impact of past state support. The
court did not, however, find it necessary, absent other "state action," to
make a final determination of the constitutionality of the tax benefits to
private schools which discriminated.3 9
In Green v. Connally,40 the district court issued a permanent injunc-
tion against granting these tax benefits to racially segregated private
schools on the ground that such benefits were inconsistent with federal
policy. The court declined to make a constitutional determination but did
predict the unconstitutionality of such tax benefits. The court seemed to
assume that any direct aid would be unconstitutional "state action" under
33. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S.
956 (1970).
34. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
35. 309 F. Supp. at 1134.
36. Id. at 1136.
37. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). See note 21 supra.
38. 309 F. Supp. at 1136.
39. The Green v. Kennedy decision prompted the comment:
[Tihe court then declared that the Fifth Amendment forbids the federal
government from aiding private discrimination ... [but] stopped short of the
conclusion . . . that tax exemption of private, segregated schools was un-
constitutional, resting its decision on the proposition that the federal govern-
ment should not frustrate the efforts of state governments to adhere to the
Constitution.
Spratt, supra note 21, at 8. See Note, Can Federal Tax Benefits Constitutionally Be
Extended to Private Segregated Schools? The Implications of Green v. Kennedy,
24 Sw. L.J. 705, 710 (1970), in which the author stated that such constitutional
determination would be a step in the right direction.
After this decision, the IRS announced that it could no longer legally
justify tax benefits to discriminatory private schools. IRS News Releases, July 10
& 19, 1970, 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. f J 6790, 6814.
40. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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the fifth amendment.41 The first case to hold that such tax benefits to
discriminatory organizations were a fortiori impermissible "state action"
in violation of the fourteenth amendment was Pitts v. Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Revenue.42 Pitts construed a Wisconsin statute which "confer [red]
special advantages in the form of preferential tax treatment . . . [on cer-
tain organizations] which discriminate in their membership on the basis
of race . . . . ,43
In considering whether the granting of a tax deduction constituted
"state action," the McGlotten court found it necessary to consider more
than the substantiality of benefits and the causal relationship to the dis-
crimination because "[e]very deduction in the tax laws provides a benefit
to the class who may take advantage of it."'44  The nature of the govern-
mental activity providing the benefit had to be considered when employ-
ing the sifting and weighing test of Burton. Since the Government,
by means of statutes, regulations, and administrative rulings, had defined
"in extensive detail not only the purposes which will satisfy the statute,
but the vehicles through which these purposes may be achieved . . . [it]
has marked certain organizations as 'Government Approved' . . . so
that they may solicit funds from the public on the basis of that approval.
The McGlotten court reasoned that this governmental approval was the
same type given by the state in Burton. The Burton Court, applying
the sifting and weighing test,46 had found that the state, by leasing space
in its parking lot to a private restaurant, had "elected to place its power,
property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination" 47 and that,
therefore, the discrimination by the restaurant had become "state action"
violative of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, by appearing to stamp its
41. Clearly the Federal Government could not under the Constitution give directfinancial aid to schools practicing racial discrimination. But tax exemptions
and deductions certainly constitute a Federal Government benefit and support.
While that support is indirect, and is in the nature of a matching grant rather
than an unconditional grant, it would be difficult indeed to establish that such
support can be provided consistently with the Constitution.
We think the Government has declined to provide support for, and in alllikelihood would be constitutionally prohibited from providing tax-exemption-
and-deduction support for, educational institutions promoting racial segregation.
Our decree will have no declaration of constitutional rights, but rather a
declaration that the Internal Revenue Code requires a denial of tax exempt status
and deductibility of contributions to private schools practicing racial discrimination.
Id. at 1164-65, 1169, 1171.
42. 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
43. Id. at 670.
44. 338 F. Supp. at 456.
45. Id. (emphasis supplied by court). The court further stated:
The rationale for allowing the deduction of charitable contributions has
historically been that by doing so, the Government relieves itself of the burden
of meeting public needs which in the absence of charitable activity would fall
on the shoulders of the government.
Id. See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUm. L. REV. 1083, 1107-08(1960).
46. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
47. 365 U.S. at 725.
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imprimatur on the private action, the state had become sufficiently involved
to call forth the equal protection requirements.
It would seem that the governmental approval is even more significant
in the instant case since, in Burton, the restaurant could have leased space
elsewhere without the aid of the government. In McGlotten, however,
the organization could not have avoided the taxes unless the Government
specifically gave it the means to do so - exemptions.
The public nature of the activity delegated to the organization in ques-
tion, the degree of control the Government has retained as to the
purposes and organizations which may benefit, and the aura of Govern-
ment approval inherent in an exempt ruling by the Internal Revenue
Service, all serve to distinguish the benefits at issue from the general
run of deductions available under the Internal Revenue Code.4 8
Other deductions, such as trade or business expenses, net operating loss
carryovers and carrybacks, income averaging and personal exemptions,
were distinguished as "attempts to provide for an equitable measure of net
income . . . [or] part of the structure of an income tax based on ability
to pay ... [or that the] provisions go no further than simply indicating
the activities hoped to be encouraged . . . [without] having the impri-
matur of the Government." 49
The McGlotten court reasoned that the Government is providing no
monetary benefit but merely defining "income," because the only income
exempted from the tax on nonprofit clubs is the "exempt function income" 50
which includes income derived from members and income set aside for
certain designated purposes.51 This is part "of defining appropriate sub-
jects of taxation."5 2 Congress had decided that no tax should be placed
on this type of organization as an entity for this type of income because no
income of the type generally taxed is generated. The same people, the
members, still have the beneficial use of the money but as an entity, rather
than individually. It is merely a pooling of income rather than a produc-
tion of additional income. Notably, however, any additional income gener-
ated from exempt function income would not be tax-exempt.5 8
The court also felt there was no mark of government approval inherent
in this exemption so as to bring it within the Burton rule because the Code
was not limited in coverage to particular activities but exempted clubs
organized for nonprofit purposes in general. 54 Since the Government was
48. 338 F. Supp. at 457.
49. Id. See Note, supra note 27, at 938.
50. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 512(a) (3) (A).
51. Id. § 512(a) (3) (B).
52. 338 F. Supp. at 458.
53. § 501 exempts nonprofit clubs from taxation other than that imposed at
corporate rates on unrelated business income by § 511. Section 512(a) (3) (A)
defines the unrelated business income of §501 (c) (7) nonprofit clubs as their
"gross income," thereby including passive investment income.
Id. at 458 n.49.
54. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 501(c) (7).
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giving these clubs neither a monetary benefit nor its imprimatur, there was
no "state action" and this exemption was thus constitutionally permissible.
The exemptions granted to fraternal orders, however, were of a differ-
ent nature and, therefore, required a different result. The exemption
applied to "passive investment income," which was income derived from
funds provided by members and invested to benefit those members. 55 The
court felt that this exemption could not be explained by defining the appro-
priate entity to be taxed.56 Here, the money was not merely "shifted
from one pocket to another, both within the same pair of pants. ' '57 Rather,
new income was being generated and the exemption was considered a
benefit. In addition, this exclusion was only given to:
[P]articular organizations with particular purposes.... By providing
differential treatment to only selected organizations, the Government
has indicated approval of the organizations and hence their discrimi-
natory practice, and aided that discrimination by the provision of
federal tax benefits.58
Therefore, both government benefits and government approval were con-
ferred on discriminatory fraternal orders, and, according to the court,
either would have been sufficient federal involvement with the private
organization to constitute "state action" violative of the fifth amendment. 0
55. 338 F. Supp. at 459.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 458.
58. Id. at 459.59. Id. A recent Supreme Court decision, Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163(1972), may indicate that McGlotten is destined to be reversed. The Court heldthat Pennsylvania's issuance of a liquor license to the Moose Lodge was not
sufficient state action to violate the fourteenth amendment. Irvis, a Negro guest of a
member, was denied service at the lodge. He brought suit for injunctive relief tohave the lodge's liquor license revoked. The district court found for the plaintiff,but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lodge's refusal to serve a guest,because he was a Negro, did not violate the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 171-72. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist explained the majority's position:
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise
private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private
entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is
subject to state regulation in any degree whatever. Since state-furnished servicesinclude such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection,
such a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between private asdistinguished from State conduct . . . . Our holdings indicate that where theimpetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have "significantlyinvolved itself with invidious discriminations," Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,380 (1967), in order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of
the constitutional prohibition.Id. at 173. Justice Rehnquist distinguished Burton on the facts: the land wasprivately, not state-owned; the lodge held itself out as a private, not a place ofpublic accommodation; and it did not provide "a service that would otherwise in
all likelihood be performed by the State." Id. at 175. These distinctions would
obviously apply to the Elks as well as to the Moose. A further distinction was
that the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board did not play any part in establishing
or enforcing the membership or guest policies of the lodge. Id. The Board's regula-
tions, however detailed, were held not to "foster or encourage racial discrimination"
nor make the state "a partner or even a joint venturer .... " Id. at 176-77.
It would seem that the Internal Revenue Service does no more to foster or
encourage discrimination in its tax policies. Nevertheless, there still may be adistinction in that there is little which is as inherently an act of government as the
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The court distinguished the Supreme Court's holding in Walz v. Tax
Commission,60 that tax exemptions were not sufficient government involve-
ment to violate the first amendment, and noted that, although the first
amendment establishment clause allowed benevolent neutrality, the four-
teenth amendment required "a strict rather than a benevolent neutrality. '61
Thus, while tax benefits may be insufficient governmental entanglement to
violate the first amendment, they are sufficient governmental aid to fall with-
in the scope of the prohibitions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 62
The court also decided that an overwhelming public policy required,
even absent the constitutional prohibitions, that the Code be interpreted
so as not to grant tax deductions for contributions to segregated fraternal
orders.63 Referring to Green v. Connally,6" where the court had held that
"[c]ongressional- intent in providing tax deductions and exemptions is
not construed to be applicable to activities that are . . . contrary to public
policy," 65 the court reasoned that the public policy as expressed in the
thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was clearly against
discrimination and that, therefore, the Code could not be construed so as
to allow these deductions.66
imposition of taxes. Whenever such an act is done in a discriminatory manner,
it would seem that the Constitution has been violated. Perhaps taxation is the
outer limit of the state action doctrine, and liquor control, an act not necessarily
done by the state, lies on the other side of the hazy boundary. Either a reversal or
an affirmance of McGlotten could logically follow from Moose Lodge.
Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented. Justice Douglas cited the "complete
and pervasive" scheme of regulation and the scarcity of liquor licenses as a re-
striction on the opportunity for Negroes to obtain liquor. Justice Brennan cited the
continual supervision of almost every detail of the business. Id. at 179, 184. Neither
Justice expressed the opinion that the mere issuance of the license by the state was
sufficient "state action" or that it branded the discrimination with the apparent
imprimatur of the state. It could thus be argued that the mere issuance of any type
of license by the state, without more, to any discriminatory private entity, is not
"state action." Whether a mere tax benefit, without more, will be deemed "state
action" remains to be seen.
If Moose Lodge is deemed controlling and McGlotten is reversed, it would
seem that Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (see note
66 infra), must be overruled, because the impact of civil rights legislation would be
reduced by the retention of income tax benefits. Deductions for the discriminatory
organizations would frustrate national policies against such discrimination, a result
seemingly inconsistent with the Tank Truck holding.
60. 397 U.S. 664 (1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REv. 374 (1970).
61. 338 F. Supp. at 459 n.58. The court also referred to its discussion of the
same issue in Green v. Connally.
62. See Note, supra note 27, at 939-40. The author suggested that tax benefits
to religious schools would be permissible under the equal protection clause where
grants of similar benefits to racially segregated schools would be impermissible
because the issues must be resolved by the weighing of two different factors.
63. 338 F. Supp. at 460.
64. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
65. Id. at 1161.
66. One author has said, in reference to segregated schools, that whether or
not the exemptions would directly violate the fourteenth amendment, it would not
represent an accommodation between the tax code and declared public policy which is
required by the Tank Truck doctrine. See Spratt, supra note 21, at 33. Basically,
the doctrine would not permit deductions which frustrate national or state policies
because such deductions have the effect of mitigating any sting from a penalty for
violating that policy. The doctrine is based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). See Spratt, supra
note 21, at 24-33; Note, supra note 21.
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Finally, the court held that tax benefits were federal financial assist-
ance within the scope of Title VI of the Act6 7 as defined in the Act and
in the regulations promulgated thereunder, and thus violated the Act when
given to organizations which discriminated. Title VI forbade discrimi-
nation against any person on the basis of race, color, or national origin
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. The
Act defined federal financial assistance as "assistance to any program or
activity by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insur-
ance or guaranty."6 The regulations, however, were much more extensive
as to what constituted federal financial assistance. For instance, the regu-
lations included within the definition: (1) grants and loans; (2) the
grant or donation of federal property or interests therein; (3) "the detail
of Federal personnel;" (4) the sale, lease, or permission to use federal
property at reduced, nominal, or no consideration; and (5) "any Federal
agreement, arrangement, or other contract which has as one of its purposes
the provision of assistance."69
The court discovered nothing in the legislative history of the Act to
indicate whether tax benefits were to be included within the definition.70
Thus, the court considered the plain purpose of the statute to be con-
trolling. Believing that purpose to be to eliminate discrimination in pro-
grams or activities benefiting from federal financial assistance and believing
that distinctions as to the method of distribution of federal funds were
immaterial, 71 the court held the provisions of the Code which gave benefits
to discriminatory organizations to be contrary to that policy and thereby
violative of the Act.72
The court then determined whether particular sections of the Code
did, in fact, provide assistance. The deductibility of contributions to fra-
ternal orders which discriminate was found to be federal financial assistance,
since it:
"[I]s a special tax provision not required by, and contrary to, widely
accepted definitions of income applicable to the determination of the
67. No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). See Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School De-
segregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42, 45-48 (1967).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970). The courts have found such assistance in
many types of direct grants. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir.
1970) (rent supplements) ; Gardner v. Alabama, 385 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968) (federally-assisted welfare programs).
69. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.2(g) (Supp. 1972); 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(c) (Supp.
1972) ; 45 C.F.R. § 80.13(f) (Supp. 1972).
70. Representative Celler, a leading congressional spokesman for the Act, in-
dicated that "grant" was not intended to be limited only to direct grants of money.
110 CONG. REC. 2467 (1964). Federal agencies have also interpreted the word "grant"
to apply broadly to both direct and indirect aid. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. FED. 548, 555
(1971). Note, supra note 22, at 430.
71. The court seems to have considered the wide variations in the regulations
issued by federal agencies as to what is federal financial assistance. See note 69
and accompanying text supra.
72. 338 F. Supp. at 461.
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structure of an income tax." It operates in effect as a Government
matching grant and is available only for the particular purposes and
to particular organizations outlined in the Code.78
It was apparent to the McGlotten court that there was no difference be-
tween tax benefits and the provision of federal property at a reduced
consideration. Additionally, the court held tax exemptions to nonprofit
clubs not to be federal financial assistance basing its decision on the same
reasoning it used to determine that they did not operate as a grant of
federal funds and thus were not "state action."74 Similarly, because the
court felt such exemptions operated like a subsidy to fraternal orders, the
exemptions operated as federal financial assistance and were in violation
of the Act.75
The broad implication of the McGlotten analysis is that any tax
benefit given to any private organization that discriminates on the basis
-of race is unconstitutional, against public policy, and violative of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. This is not to say that every tax exemption or deduc-
tion granted to such organizations is unconstitutional, but those that
represent a benefit conferred on a particular organization or class of organi-
zations - those that are more than a part of the statutory definition' of
income or an across-the-board benefit - can no longer be given to such
organizations. Tax benefits are now recognized as within the financial
aid-state action theory and as a mark of governmental approval, bringing
them within the Burton rationale.
The court might have extended its decision to include all exemptions
and deductions permitted by the Code, on the theory that they are all
granted by the grace of the legislature and are thus benefits, regardless of
'the specific rationale behind each exemption or deduction. In this manner
-all exemptions and deductions would be -"state action" and would fall
within the scope of equal protection. The legislative policy on civil rights
could then be more effective because more pressure would be placed on
those whose actions were contrary to that policy. 76 Discrimination would
become a very expensive luxury to an organization which lost all tax
73, Id. at 462.
74. Id. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
75. Id.
76, The Tank Truck doctrine (see note 66 supra) would be applicable regardless
of the constitutionality of the tax benefits. Other means of preventing discriminatory
private organizations from receiving tax benefits, regardless of the constitutionality of
.such tax benefits, could result from changes in the Internal Revenue Code. The
definitions of organizations in section 501 could be changed so as to exclude all
organizations which discriminate or section 503 could be changed so as to deny
exemption to discriminatory organizations (a section 501 exemption is dependent
upon non-denial under sections 502 or 503). However, since Tank Truck does not
prohibit ordinary and necessary expenses as deductions even for an illegal business,
it might be advisable to change the meaning of "ordinary and necessary" so as to
specifically exclude the expenses of a discriminatory organization. Should such
changes be deemed to have altered the tax from an "income" tax as required by the
sixteenth amendment, Congress might levy an "excise" tax on such organizations to
avoid the prohibitions against an unproportional "direct" tax as set forth in article
I, section 9(4) of the Constitution.
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benefits as a result of it. Since most people generally utilize some type of
tax benefit to their advantage, the effects of McGlotten could have covered
a much broader range of organizations than those that will, in fact, be
affected by the holding.77
The McGlotten method of enforcing public policy could extend beyond
discrimination to many other national policies. A policy against pollution
could be aided by denying tax benefits to any corporation that discharged
pollutants into the air or water. A policy against overpopulation could be
encouraged by removing any dependency deductions beyond those for one
or two children. Some might view such developments as an encroachment
by the government into a private segment of our society. However, an
appropriate response would be that an express policy of the government
should be implemented to the fullest extent possible.
The problem of policing would be no greater than at present. Once
an organization was found, by a method sufficient to meet the due process
requirement, to be in violation of any national policy, it would not be
able to utilize any exemptions or deductions in computing its tax pay-
ments. A subsequent hearing or court proceeding could be provided by
which it could be removed from the list of violators and again be eligible
for tax benefits. Although deductions for contributions made to nonprofit
organizations violating public policy would be more difficult to police, that
problem applies to any charitable deduction. Presently, when someone de-
ducts a contribution to an organization, unless the return is audited, the IRS
does not ascertain whether it has granted that organization charitable status.
The effects of McGlotten will probably fall hardest on the segregated
private schools, many of which could not exist without contributions which
may not be forthcoming without the incentive of an income tax deduction.78
Removing such tax benefits could force many of these schools out of exist-
ence and provide, at least to some extent, more integration. Furthermore,
it is quite likely that the rationale of this case will be applied to private
schools, especially since much of the court's reasoning was based on the
Green cases, both of which dealt with that very situation.7 9 A school receiv-
ing tax benefits, especially in the form of deductions for contributions,
receives the Government's imprimatur no less than a fraternal organization.
Considering the sifting and weighing test and the vigorous policy against
the racial segregation of schools, there would seem to be a more com-
pelling reason for declaring unconstitutional tax benefits given to these
private schools than for a similar holding for those tax benefits given to
77. An additional constitutional problem - the denial of equal protection to
businesses not allowed their ordinary and necessary expense deductions - may arise.
A possible solution, however, would change the definition of ordinary and necessary
expenses to exclude expenses incurred in practices contrary to public policies.
78. The district court in Coffey v. State Educ. Finance Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389(S.D. Miss. 1969), said that the formation and operation of many new private
schools was on the thinnest financial basis. Id. at 1392. See Green v. Kennedy, 309
F. Supp. 1127, 1134-36 (D.D.C. 1970).
79. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text suPra.
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